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Summum Ius Summa Iniuria—Comments on the Historical 
Background of a Legal Maxim of Interpretation 
 
 
Abstract. Interpretation based on maxims of legal logic occupies an honourable place among 
the possible methods of legal interpretation; this being done most frequently using basic concepts 
originating from the classical period of Roman law, which faciliate orientation among contra-
dictory decrees and help to clarify the meaning of legal rules. The following principles 
belong hereby, widely known in Modestinus’s formulation but dating from the period of the 
leges XII tabularum: „lex posterior derogat legi priori”, the Papinian „lex specialis derogat 
legi generali”, and the „lex primaria derogat legi subsidiariae”. It is a basic interpretive 
principle, that the legal rule should be interpreted in its integrity, not by extracting certain parts 
of it. The following the letter of the law often leads to its evasion. During the interpretation one 
should take into account the legislator’s intention. If this is doubtful, the more lenient 
solution should be preferred. All these ideas can be traced back into a highly philosophical, 
Celsian principle, which is—also widely accepted in contemporary legal thinking. It—declares 
the vocation of the Law to implement Justice, according to which „ius est ars boni et aequi”, 
the Law is an art of the Good and the Just. Out of these, the procedure called in fraudem legis 
is connected to the statement that enforcing the letter of the law often leads to inequity 
contradictory with the spirit of the law, i. e. injustice. Cicero also quotes this proverbium, 
already widely spread in the age of the Republic, which remained in use in his formulation 
until today: „summum ius summa iniuria”, i. e. the utmost enforcement of the law leads to the 
greatest injustice. 
 The present paper has a modest aim. It does not offer a general survey, but rather an 
introspection into the problem. First it enumerates the occurences of this proverb in the sources 
of Roman literature (I.), then it sketches the development and semantic changes of the concept 
of interpretatio (II.), next it investigates the meaning of summum ius in the relation of the ars 
boni et aequi principle and the concept of Justice in legal sources and Cicero’s works (III.), in 
the end it will consider the further reaching consequences of this proverbium in Adagia by 
Erasmus of Rotterdam, one of the most important humanists (IV.). 
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I. This idea occurs for the first time in Terence’s comedy, Heautontimoroumenos: 
„Neque tu scilicet / illuc confugies: ’Quid mea? Num mihi datumst? Num iussi? 
Num illa oppignerare filiam meam me invito potuit?’ Verum illuc, Cherme, / 
dicunt: Ius summum saepe summast malitia.”1 The situation is the as follows: 
Syrus asks Chermes for money, so that he could help his young master, but in 
order to get the sum he claims that he needs it for Chermes’s daughter. The law 
is indoubtedly on Chermes’s side, but the unconditioned clinging to the law 
cannot be reconciliated with the pietas and clementia expected from a Roman 
pater familias. In order to analyse the summa malitia turning point it is useful to 
peruse some meanings and the most typical occurences of the summus–summa–
summum adjective and the different connotations of the word malitia. In its 
original meaning summus is the Latin equivalent of the Greek hypathos.2 
Varro3 and Isidorus Hispalensis4 use it as a grammatical technical term for 
the explanation of the superlativus, while Quintilian applies it for the description 
of rhetorical amplification.5 Used figuratively, it can be encountered in many 
places, both with temporal meaning6 and in relation with social status,7 e.g. 
applied to the optimates and the nobiles8 as the contradiction of the humiles, 
the infima plebs9 and the infimus ordo.10 Isidorus describes the word malitia, 
deriving from the word malus, as the evil thought of mind,11 it occurs in the 
works of many auctors as the synonym of astutia and calliditas.12 In the prologue 





 Terentius: Heautontimoroumenos 792. sqq. 
 
2
 Walde, A.—Hofmann, J. B.: Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch I–II. Heidelberg, 
1954. II 630. 
 
3
 Varro: De lingua Latina 8, 75. 
 
4
 Isidorus: Origines sive etymologiae 1, 7, 27. 
 
5
 Quintilianus: Institutio oratoria 7, 10. 
 
6
 Plautus: Asinaria 534; Persa 33; Pseudolus 374; Cicero: Cato maior de senectute 
78; Suetonius: Tiberius 64, 4. 
 
7
 Plautus: Cistellaria 516; Amphitruo 77; Captivi 279; Mercator 694; Stichus 409; Persa 
418; Cicero: Tusculanae disputationes 2, 144. 
 
8
 Plautus: Stichus 492. sq.; Cistellaria 23. sq.; Pseudolus 70; Mercator 604; Terentius: 
Heautontimoroumenos 227. 609; Adelphoe 502. 
 
9
 Plautus: Cistellaria 24. sq.; Terentius: Eunuchus 489; Hecyra 380; Cicero: Epistulae 
ad Atticum 4, 1, 5; Philippica in M. Antonium 2, 3. 
 
10
 Carcaterra, A.: ‘Ius summum saepe summast malitia’, In: Studi in onore di E. 
Volterra, Milano 1971. IV. 631. sqq. 
 
11
 Isidorus: Differentiae 1, 358. Cogitatio prova mentis malitia appellatur. 
 
12
 Isidorus: Origines sive etymologiae 10, 6. Astutus ab astu vocatus, quid est callidi et 
cauti nominis, qui possit sine periculo fortiter aliquid facere;. Cf. Carcaretta: op. cit. 638. 
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his comedy,13 which, with regard to the above cited proverbium, can most 
probably be identified with two lines by Menander,14 though the two ideas do 
not correspond word for word.15 Terence speaks about ius, whereas Menander 
mentions nomoi, i. e. the laws and not dikaion; the synchophantés has a slightly 
wider semantic meaning than malitia, which could be translated into Latin as 
damnum, calumnia or malum, in any way designating a content in contradiction 
with the spirit and destination of ius.16 The lian akribós can be equally translated 
by the phrase summo iure or nimis exacto quodam studio.17 Hence it becomes 
obvious that Terence heavily altered the Menandrian thought and adapted it to 
the circumstances of Roman legal life but preserved its basic message.18 
 Hieronymus takes his version from this Terentian locus: „O vere ius summum 
summa malitia.”19 A statement with similar content (summum ius summa crux) 
is formulated by Columella, when he deals with the responsibilities of the pater 
familias and the dominus: „comiter agat cum colonis facilemque se prebeat, … 
sed nec dominus in unaquaque re, cui colonum obligaverit, tenax esse sui iuris 
debet, sicut in diebus pecuniarum vel lignis et ceteris paucibus accessionibus 
exigendis, quarum cura maiorem molestiam quam impensam rusticis adfert. Nec 
sane vindicandum nobis quidquid licet, nam summum ius antiqui summam 
putabant crucem.”20 So it is forbidden to deal too harshly with the colonii, the 
master should exercise the virtues of meekness and consideration.21 
 The proverbium passed into legal common knowledge in Cicero’s formu-
lation in De Officiis: „Existunt saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et nimis 
callida, sed malitiosa iuris interpretatione. Ex quo illud ’summum ius summa 





 Terentius: Heautontimoroumenos 4–5. 
 
14
 Menandr. Nr. 545. 
 
15
 About the question of contaminatio in Terence’s comedies see Rieth: Die Kunst des 
Menanders in den Adelphen des Terenz. Hildesheim, 1964. 
 
16
 Donatus: Commentarius a. h. l. Summum ius saepe summa est malitia id enim, 
quod datum est, utique reddendum est, sed iure cautum est, ut filia quidquid acceperit 
vel filiae nomine datum fuerit, quae in familia est, non recte datum videatur. Itaque 




 Carcaterra: op. cit. 641. 
 
18
 Carcaterra: op. cit. 644. 
 
19
 Hieronymus: Epistulae 1, 44. 
 
20
 Columella: De re rustica 1, 7, 1. sq. 
 
21
 Fuhrmann, M.: Philologische Bemerkungen zur Sentenz ‘Summum ius, summa 
iniuria’, In: Studi in onore di E. Volterra, Milano, 1971. II. 74. 
 
22
 Cicero: De officiis 1, 33. 
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the ius itself that results in iniuria, but the malevolent enforcement of a 
seemingly lawful claim is the case, when injustice is committed unter the 
mask of law enforcement.23 Taking into consideration the bequeathing of the 
proverbium, one can safely assert that the Terentian and Columellian versions 
are more closely connected to each other than to the Ciceroniam antithesis, and 
that they represent an earlier stage in the formulation of this thought.24 In these 
two authors’ work the clash of the legal and moral norms becomes fore-
grounded, i. e. the action permitted and approved by the ius becomes a subject 
of contest from the side of the mos.25 The Ciceronian formulation goes even 
further: it is not only the legal and ethical norm that conflict here, the collision 
takes place within the legal system.26 The claim is made not only for a morally 
correct decision but also for the right and justified application of the law. The 
proverb objects to the abuse of the law, to its literal and not sensible inter-
pretation.27 (The phrase factum etiam tritum sermone proverbium could refer to 
the fact that Cicero himself took over the idea of summum ius summa iniuria 
from an earlier auctor or the practice of the forum. It can be also assumed that 
he is referring to his own rhetorical practice when he emphasises the great 
familiarity of the proverb, as he frequently used the summo iure agere and the 
summo iure contendere phrases, too.28) 
 However, he greatly exceeds the requirement of equitable legal interpretation 
in De legibus, where, among other things, he analyses the connection between 
natural law and positive law.29 In this work Cicero appears as legislator—as his 





 Bürge, A: Die Juristenkomik in Ciceros Rede Pro Murena, Zürich, 1974. 53; Földi 
A.—Hamza G.: A római jog története és institúciói (History an Institutes of Roman 
Law), Budapest, 2004. (9th edition) 73. 
 
24
 Stroux, J.: ‘Summum ius, summa iniuria’ Ein Kapitel der Geschichte der inter-
pretatio iuris, Berlin—Leipzig 1926. 21; Fuhrmann: op. cit. 1971. 74. 
 
25
 Stroux: op. cit. 49. 
 
26
 Fuhrmann: op. cit. 1971. 75. 
 
27
 Büchner, K.: Summum ius summa iniuria. In: Humanitas Romana. Heidelberg, 1957. 
102; Tomulescu, C. S.: Der juristische Wert des Werkes Ciceros. In: Gesellschaft und 
Recht im griechisch-römischen Altertum. Berlin, 1968. I. 230. 
 
28
 Cicero: In Verrem 6, 4. Non agam summo iure tecum, non dicam id quod debeam 
forsitan obtinere, cum iudicium certa lege sit.; Epistulae ad Atticum 16, 15, 1. Ego ... 
dubitassem fortasse utrum remissior essem an summo iure contenderem. 
 
29
 Tomulescu: op. cit. 230. 
 
30
 Cicero: De legibus 1, 15. 
 
31
 Cf. Görgemanns, H.: Beiträge zur Interpretation von Platons Nomoi, München, 
1960; Morrow, G. R.: Plato’s Cretan City, Princeton, 1960. 
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new, almost provoking indignation, because doing this he intended to reform 
and replace the venerated leges XII tabularum,32 thus occupying the place of 
the nation who made these laws.33 The first book contains considerations of 
legal theory, which was practically unknown in Rome in the 1st century BC. It 
aims at harmonizing statutory law with natural law because this was the only 
way Roman law could lay claim to universality.34 From the demand of ius 
naturale neither the comitia, nor the senatus can give exemption, this being 
eternal and unchanging. The fundamental task of the legislator and the judge is 
to porceed according to this,35 and the task of the law is to separate the lawful 
from the unlawful.36 The law and the ratio are inseparably connected, 
moreover, they are each other’s synonyms in a certain respect; so the law must 
originate directly from philosophy and not from the pretorial edict or the leges 
XII tabularum, thus it can never lose its validity.37 He formulates in a strictly 
imperative mood the demand never before written down in Rome: „Lex iusta 
esto!”38 Law must be based on Justice, which might seem trivial in itself, but 
Cicero had felt the lack of this condition himself; thus the law solely depends 
on Justice, and social cohabitation depends only on the law, this conclusion 
must have seemed considerably bold in ancient Rome.39 Cicero, appearing in 
philosophy as a great system originator, wanted to encompass law in a system 
as well as in his work—unfortunately lost since then—entiteled De iure civili in 
artem redigendo, which does not seem to have exerted much influence on legal 
scholars in Rome.40 
 Returning to summum ius summa iniuria: it was quite common that certain 
maxims formulated in everyday life and transmitted through literary sources 
were appropriated by Law as rules of universal validity. Just as example, I 





 Cicero: De legibus 2, 23. 59. 
 
33
 Knoche, U.: Ciceros Verbindung der Lehre vom Naturrecht mit dem römischen 
Recht und Gesetz, In: Cicero ein Mensch seiner Zeit, hg. Radke, G. Berlin, 1968. 41. 
 
34
 Hamza, G.: A ius naturale a Corpus Ciceronianumban (The ius naturale in the 
Corpus Ciceronianum). In: Hereditas Ciceroniana. Debrecen, 1995. 75. sqq. 
 
35
 Cicero: De re publica 3, 22. 
 
36
 Cicero: De legibus 2, 13. 
 
37
 Cicero: De legibus 1, 18; 2, 14. 
 
38
 Cicero: De legibus 1, 18. 
 
39
 Knoche: op. cit. 46. sqq. 
 
40
 Lübtow, U. v.: Cicero und die Methode der römischen Jurisprudenz. In: Festschrift 
für L. Wenger. München, 1944. I. 232. 
 
41
 Carcaterra: op. cit. 663. 
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Romanus quotes the sentence „cui quod libet, hoc licet”,42 which can be found 
in Ulpianus as „non omne quod licet honestum est”.43 Publius Syrus’s thought, 
„lucrum absque damno alieno fieri non potest”44 resonates with Pomponius’s 
rule: „iure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento fieri 
locupletiorem”.45 Seneca maior’s sentence „tacite loquitur; silentium videtur 
confessio”46 corresponds with Paulus’s „qui tacet, non utique fatetur: sed 
tamen verum est eum non negare”.47 
 
II. In order to highlight the origin and the meaning of the word interpretatio, 
let us examine the loci to see in what context the concept interpres and 
interpretari in Plautus, and other, mainly fragmentary bequethed authors of 
archaic Roman literature. In Poennulus the slave says that the speech of his 
master could only be made intellegible by Oedipus, who solved the enigma of 
the Sphinx too.48 In Pseudolus the content of an undecipherable letter could be 
solved only by the Sybilla.49 Both cases are concerned with the deciphering the 
meaning of extremely intricate texts, which can be done exclusively by 
oracula, the solvers of great predictions, of mythical secrets, so the author 
draws the activity of interpretari into the scope of religious mysteries and 
endows it with the meaning of decoding, of solving an enigma.50 In Bacchides, 
the importunate messenger is made to leave in a comic fashion but with quite 
resolutely, by the use of very palpable means,51 to which the messenger, who 
interpreted the highly paraphrased threat for himself thought it better to 





 Aquila Romanus: De figuris sententiarum 27. 
 
43
 Ulp. D. 50, 17, 144. 
 
44
 Publilius Syrus: Sententiae L, 6. 
 
45
 Pomp. D. 50, 17, 206. 
 
46
 Seneca: Controversiae 10, 2, 6. 
 
47
 Paul. D. 50, 17, 142 
 
48








 Fuhrmann, M.: Interpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte, in: Sympotica F. Wieacker. 
Göttingen, 1970. 82. 
 
51
 Plautus: Bacchides 595. sq. Ne tibi hercle haud longe est os ab infortunio, ita 
dentifragibula haec meis manibus gestiunt. 
 
52
 Plautus: Bacchides 597. Cum ego huius verba interpretor, mihi cautiost. 
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the hetaira speaking with him that she seduced her son;53 in this case it is not 
the enigmatic words and composition of the interlocutor where one should 
draw conclusions from, but it is rather the conclusion drawn from the situation, 
the subjective opinion that is denominated by the word interpretor.54 Refreshing 
the interlocutor’s memory, recalling a certain event can also be signified by the 
verb interpretari,55 elsewhere the revealer, the solver of a doubtful situation, or 
the implementor of a plan is called the interpres. In the last case it is the 
synonym of internuntius.56 Thus Plautus uses the expressions interpres and 
interpretari with two connotations, on the one hand in their original sense, 
meaning mediation, on the other hand in the sense of understanding, making to 
understand, a more abstact and indirect meaning; this latter meaning including 
a kind of irrational activity, pertaining to the realm of the religio.57 This seems 
to be corroborated by the fragments after Plautus and before Cicero. A 
Pacuvian fragment connects the task of the interpres with the interretive 
activity of the augures and haruspices and it mentions a sinister prodigium,58 
placing the interpretive activity within the context of Roman religious 
institutions.59 A fragment from a Latin translation of the Ilias contains a line 
from Agamemnon’s reply to Calchas’s premonition; comparing it to the 
Homeric text it becomes evident that interpres here stands for the Greek 
mantis.60 It is also a fragment by Pacuvius, according to which the activity of 
the interpretari in the course of interpreting obscure texts is at certain times 
doomed to highly uncertain guesses.61 Based on this, we can assume that in the 
beginning the interpres mediated not only between humans but also between 





 Plautus: Cistellaria 316. sqq. Sed cum dicta huius interpretor, haec herclest, ut 
ego opinor, meum quae corrumpit filium. Suspiciost eam esse, utpote quam numquam 
videro; de opinione credo. 
 
54
 Fuhrmann: Interpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte. op. cit. 84. 
 
55
 Plautus: Epidicus 552. 
 
56
 Plautus: Miles gloriosus 798. 951. sq. 962. 
 
57
 Fuhrmann: Interpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte. op. cit. 84. 
 
58
 Pacuvius v. 80. sqq. (Tragicorum Romanorum Fragmenta, ed. Ribbeck, O., 
Leipzig, 1871.) Cives, antiqui amici maiorum meum, consilium socii, augurium atque 
extum interpretes, postquam prodigium horriferum, portentum pavos. 
 
59
 About the aurures and haruspices cf. Latte, K.: Römische Religionsgeschichte, 
München, 1967. 141. 158. 
 
60
 Matius frg. 2. (Fragmenta Poetarum Latinorum, ed. W. Morel, Leipzig 1927.) 
Obsceni interpres funestique ominis auctor.; Cf. Il. 1, 106. sq. 
 
61
 Pacuv. v. 151. sq. (Tragicorum Romanorum Fragmenta, ed. Ribbeck, O. Leipzig, 
1871.) Nil coniectura quivi interpretarier, quorsum flexiloqua dictio contenderet. 
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everyday logic he had to employ certain means belonging to the realm of the 
irrational as well.62 
 For the religious usage of these expressions one can find ample evidence in 
the Corpus Ciceronianum and other authors from the contemporary Roman 
literature; augures, haruspices, decemviri and Persian magi are mentioned as 
interpretes,63 premonitions, miraculous and sinister signs, thunderstrucks, 
dreams, religious phenomena, and generally the will of the gods, all pertaining 
to the sphere of religio, constitute the object of interpretari.64 In many cases 
the expressions interpres and coniector serve as each other’s explanation, 
highlighting each other.65 According to Cicero, this interpretive activity is 
necessary because of the obscure and doubtful nature of certain religious 
phenomena. It is not surprising however that the concept of interpretatio was 
eagerly connected to obscure and polisemic contents outside the circle of 
religio too, e. g. in philosophical polemic.66 
 In accordance with sacral connotations the most practical, everyday use of 
interpres can also be founded, it occurs in diplomatic, administrative, military 
and commercial fields too. In these cases the interpres is noone other than 
interpreter or translator. In the sources the interpreter translates word for word, 
verbum pro verbo, and in this respect he can be regarded as the contrary of the 
rhetor, who possibly takes over a thought from somebody else, but enriches 
and embellishes it with elements of style when delivering it to the audience.67 
Cicero himself used these possibilities of individualisation when he translated 
the speeches of Greek rhetors into Latin, an in his philosophical works with 
respect to the employment of Greek models.68 Horace, giving advice to poets, 





 Fuhrmann: Interpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte. op. cit. 85. 
 
63
 Cicero: De legibus 2, 20; Philippica in M. Antonium 13, 12; De natura deorum 2, 
12; 3, 5; De divinatione 1, 3. 4. 46; 2, 110; Livius: Ab urbe condita 10, 8, 2; Gellius: 
Noctes Atticae 4, 1, 1. 
 
64
 Cicero: De legibus 2, 20. 30; De divinatione 1, 3. 45. 92. 93. 116; Pro M. Aemilio 
Scauro 30; De domo sua 107; Quintilianus: Institutio oratoria 3, 6, 30; Plinius: 
Naturalis historia 2, 141; 7, 203; Gellius: Noctes Atticae 4, 1, 1; Valerius Maximus: 
Facta et dicta memorabilia 1, 5. 6. 
 
65
 Cicero: De natura deorum 2, 12; De divinatione 1, 118; 2, 62. 66. 144; 
Quintilianus: Institutio oratoria 3, 6, 30. 
 
66
 Cicero: De divinatione 1, 1166; De natura deorum 1, 39; Quintilianus: Institutio 
oratoria 3, 4, 3. 
 
67
 Cicero: De finibus bonorum et malorum 3, 15; Hieronymus: Epistulae 57, 5. 
 
68
 Cicero: De optimo genere oratorum 14; De legibus 2, 17; De officiis 1, 6; 2, 60; 
De oratore 1, 23; Academica priora 2. 1, 6; De finibus bonorum et malorum 1, 6. 
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manner of the interpres.69 Quintilian challenges a poet’s originality precisely 
because of his being an interpres.70 Interpretatio as a technical term first 
occurs in rhetorics namely in Auctor ad Herennium’s discourse concerning 
rhetoric figures, according to which a kind of geminatio; the conduplicatio 
only differs from interpretatio in that the verbum pro verbo translation is a 
form-and-content.true transfer of a train of thought from a different language 
whereas conduplicatio is the same activity within a single language.71 
Quintilian does not consider the interpretatio to be a rhetoric figure as it was 
previously by Cornificius, but sees in it only an exercise to be used in the 
course of rhetoric training.72 In certain cases interpretatio means the 
etymological analysis of words and the most precise rendering in Latin of the 
Greek technical terms, in course of which, as Cicero warns, one should avoid 
excessive hair splitting.73 
 It can be concluded that in the Ciceromian age the expression interpres 
was used in two clearly separable meanings. On the one hand it was used as 
interpres deorum, for the definition of the person enlightening phenomena 
from the sphere of religio, transmitting the divine will towards the human 
realm, on the other hand (as the religious semantic content did not entirely 
occupy this concept) it was used for denoting the interpreter and translator 
mediating in human communication by bridging linguistic impediments.74 
 As a scientific technical term, the word interpres first became widely used in 
the fields of philology and legal science. Cicero does not call the philologists 
interpretes,75 according to Suetonius’s relations however Cornelius Nepos 
already mentions them as poetarum interpretes.76 In the field of legal science 
Livius remembers Tullus Hostilius as „clemens legis interpres”,77 though this 









 Quintilianus: Institutio oratoria 10, 1, 87. 
 
71
 Auctor ad Herennium 4, 38; Cf. Fuhrmann: op. cit. 1970. 88. 
 
72
 Quintilianus: Institutio oratoria 9, 3, 98; 10, 5, 5. 
 
73
 Cicero: De divinatione 1, 1; Topica 35; De officiis 2, 5; De finibus bonorum et 
malorum 3, 15; Livius: Ab urbe condita 1, 44, 4; Seneca: De beneficiis 1, 3, 6; Gellius: 
Noctes Atticae 4, 9, 9; Quintilianus: Institutio oratoria 5, 10, 8; Cf. Fuhrmann: op. cit. 
1970. 89; Flashar, H.: Formen der Aneingnung griechischer Literatur durch die 
Übersetzung, Arcadia 3. 1968. 
 
74
 Fuhrmann: Interpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte. op. cit. 91. 
 
75
 Cicero: De divinatione 1, 34. 
 
76
 Suetonius: De grammaticis 4. 
 
77
 Livius: Ab urbe condita 1, 26, 8. 
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law concerning provocatio, he only faciliated its implementation.78 In Pliny’s 
Naturalis Historia the Ephesian Hermodoros appears as the interpres of the 
leges XII tabularum but it means only translator,79 just as in Pomponius’s text 
the mentioning of Hermodoros as auctor means the same.80 However in 
connection with the lex Valeria, dating from 449 BC., conferring the status of 
sacrosanctus on the trinuni plebis, aediles and the iudices decemviri, Livius 
already speaks about the interpretes as a genuine legal technical term, as they 
tried to establish the correct interpretation of this law in long legal debates.81 
Both the explanators of the leges XII tabularum, driven by an archeological 
interest, usually searching for the meaning of a forgotten word, and the iuris 
prudentes of the near past are mentioned as interpretes in the 1. century BC. 
sources.
82
 Cicero does not simply call the lawyers of his time interpretes 
iuris—as it was later used by Quintilian as the equivalent of iuris consultus83—
but rather he defines the task of interpretari as a basic component of the iuris 
consultus’s activity, at times narrowing its scope using synonyms.84 In De 
oratore, in the parts concerned with establishing the place and importance of 
the auxiliary sciences of rhetorics from the point of view of the theory of 
science and dialectics Cicero does not mention interpretatio.85 Cicero, in his 
work entiteled Brutus — dealing with the history of Roman rhetorics — in the 
loci dedicated to his friend, one of the most outstanding lawyers of the age, 
Servius Suplicius,86 makes some remarks concerning certain cases of 
interpretatio (primary highlighting its task to clarify and order obscure and 
doubtful states of affairs), but neglects to make its methodology and inner 





 Fuhrmann: Interpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte. op. cit. 92. 
 
79
 Plinius: Naturalis historia 43, 21. 
 
80
 Pomp. D. 1, 2, 2, 4. 
 
81
 Livius: Ab urbe condita 3, 55, 8. 
 
82
 Cicero: De oratore 1, 193; De legibus 2, 59; Brutus 144; Philippica in M. 
Antonium 9, 10; Cf. Fuhrmann: op. cit. 1970. 92. sq. 
 
83
 Quintilianus: Institutio oratoria 3, 6, 59; Cf. C. 1, 14, 12, 5; 7, 4, 17. pr.; 6, 29, 4. 
pr.; 6, 23, 30. 
 
84
 Cicero: Pro Balbo 20; Pro Caecina 70; De oratore 1, 199; De legibus 1, 14; De 
officiis 2, 65. 
 
85
 Cicero: De oratore 1, 185–192; Cf. K. Barwick: Das rednerische Bildungsideal 
Ciceros, Berlin 1963. 7.  sqq. 
 
86
 About Servius Sulpicius Rufus see Schulz, F.: Geschichte der römischen 
Rechtswissenschaft, Weimar 1961. 65; Stein, P.: The place of Servius Sulpicius Rufus in 
the development of Roman legal science, In: Festschrift für Wieacker F., Göttingen, 
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instances of interpretatio iuris when the iuris consultus is dealing with the 
applicability and modes of application of perfectly clearly formulated legal 
texts containing decrees of general validity.87 
 In legal texts, the expression interpres can seldom be encountered, and not 
as a technical term, it usually means translator or interpreter here88 and only in 
specific cases does it signify the person doing the interpretation, the one searching 
for the meaning of texts.89 The derivations interpretari and interpretatio 
beyond any doubts mean the interpretive activity performed by lawyers and 
forums administrating justice. Following Fuhrmann’s thematization, this inter-
pretive activity could refer to different legal transactions (e. g. testamenta, 
stipulationes, contractus), to the laws in general, to criminal laws, to verdicts 
in criminal cases, imperial privileges, and certain concrete decrees resulting 
from the leges XII tabularum, other laws, the pretorial edict, senatus consulta 
and constitutiones.90 In certain cases the meaning of interpretari ranges from 
interpretation to assumption and establishing.91 Based on this, the formational 
and developmental process of the meaning of interpretari become visible. In 
the preclassical age, interpretatio often occurs in the spheres of religion and 
mantics, i. e. indicating the mediation between the divine and human spheres. 
However, from Cicero’s time the latest, it became to mean the translator’s 
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humans. From this time both grammar and rhetorics, and on their analogy 
jurisprudence, began to use it as their own technical term.92 
 
III. Celsus’s famous statement „ius est ars boni et aequi”—transmitted by 
Ulpianus—occurs as the opening idea of Iustinian Digesta, according to this, 
whoever intends to deal with law should first know where its name comes 
from. Ius got its name from iustitia—as Celsus astutely defines—law is the art 
of the good and the equitable.93 Following this train of thought, Ulpianus states 
that lawyers should exercise their profession as a priestly vocation, because 
they must respect justice, propagate the knowledge of the good and the 
equitable, separating the legal from the illegal, the permissible from the 
forbidden.94 Later Ulpianus defines justice as an unceasing and eternal effort to 
give everybody their due right. Therefore the commandments of the law are 
the following: to live decently, not to hurt anyone, to give everybody their 
due.95 This definition being considerably well known, there is not need of 
further explanation. In concordance with this Ulpianus expressis verbis calls 
the magistrates’ attention to the fact that unlawful procedures are forbidden. 
As far as judges are concerned—for whom it is also forbidden to proceed with 
partiality, prejudice, or generally incorrectly—they must keep in mind the 
principle of aequitas, especially in the cases in which their personal conside-
ration is of greater importance.96 The mere memorization of the legal material 
is not equivalent with the genuine knowledge of law, as Celsus emphasises, 
and he strongly blames the lawyers who do not want to consider the entire law 
when solving a case, and who only present an arbitrarily selected portion even 
while justifying their responsa.97 The „suum cuique tribuere” principle is in 
remarkable resonance with that locus of Cicero’s Topica which defines the ius 
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the scope of preserving their goods.98 Regarding the Corpus Ciceronianum, in 
the speech delivered in defence of L. Licinius Murena, this contradiction is 
throughly highlighted: in connection with certain legal institutions of marital 
law (coemptio tutelae evitandae causa, coemptio sacrorum interimendorum 
causa),99 which became empty and troublesome by the time of Cicero, the 
rhetor formulates:100 „In omni denique iure civili aequitatem relinquerunt, verba 
ipsa tenuerunt.”101 So, criticism is not directed against the keystone of the state, 
the laws,102 only against legal practitioners and their methods of interpretation. 
 The loci from the Corpus Ciceronianum referring to aequitas—with special 
regard to Cicero’s theoretical works—can be classified in the following 
categories.103 In certain cases aequitas appears as the opposite of ius,104 in 
other cases one can find the trinity of aequitas–ius–lex, which divides the 
concept of law in a very special way.105 On the one hand it divides justice into 
a ius based on lex, on the other hand into a ius based on aequitas.106 Elsew-
here—e. g. in Pro Caecina—aequitas is none other than the means of inter-
pretatio iuris.107 A third different group is constituted by the loci where 
aequitas is mentioned as a synonym of ius.108 In his philosophical works 
aequitas appears in many thoughts as a projection, a form of iustitia, being the 
foundation of human relationships.109 It brings us closer to our present topic of 
discussion if we try to trace the occurences of aequitas in Cicero’s speeches 
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characteristic feature,110 this is the way he characterises Scipio111 and Servius 
Sulpicius,112 and he expects every Roman in office to possess this quality, he 
finds it particulary desirable in the case of judges.113 At the same time iustitia 
appears only as an exception as somebody’s personal feature in Ciceronian 
characterisations.114 Aequitas, often mentioned together with ius, not only as its 
complementary, is considered an ethical norm playing an important role in the 
administration of law.115 So it does not appear as the kind of equity that would 
give the judge the possibility to reach a decision in contradiction with written 
law because this way the verdict could easily become unjust, coming to a 
result contradictory with its aim.116 
 Let us take a quick view—following Pringsheim’s statements—to the changes 
that the concept of aequitas underwent after Cicero, as the complementary and 
opposite of ius, and see how the concepts of ius aequum and ius strictum are 
formed.117 The ius aequum adjectival construction does not mean the legal 
interpretation, used in an abstract sense, based on equity, but the adjective 
aequus means, both in literary and legal sources, according to its original 
sense, the equal right, identically available for everybody.118 Basically, it is not 
the ius that is divided into ius aequum and ius strictum, but aequitas appears as 
a principle regulating, at times correcting ius, at times harmonising with it, at 
times constituting a contradictory principle, which however, has never been 
defined at the level of an abstract definition, probably due to a lack of effort.119 
In the time of the dominate aequitas kept gaining terrain from ius, a turning 
point in this being was Constantinus’s legislation who on the one hand 
declared that the emperor alone is entiteled to interpret the difference between 





 Cicero: Ad Quintum fratrem 1, 1, 45. 
 
111
 Cicero: In Verrem 5, 81. 
 
112
 Cicero: Ad familiares 4, 4, 3; Philippica in M. Antonium 9, 10. 
 
113
 Cicero: De lege agraria 2, 102; Pro M. Tullio 8; Pro L. Valerio Flacco 49; Pro 
Cluentio 5. 159. 
 
114
 Cicero: Ad familiares 13, 28 A, 2; 13, 66, 2; Cf. Bürge: op. cit. 49. sqq. 
 
115
 Cicero: De oratore 1, 86. 173; Cf. Schulz op. cit. 90; F. Pringsheim: Ius aequum 
und ius strictum, ZSS 42. 1921. 643. sqq. 
 
116
 Cicero: Philippica in M. Antonium 5, 20; De imperio Cn. Pompei 58; Cf. Bürge: 
op. cit. 52. 
 
117
 Pringsheim: 643. sqq. 
 
118
 Cicero: In Verrem 3, 118; Livius: Ab urbe condita 38, 50, 9; Tacitus: Annales 3, 
27; Seneca: Epistulae ad Lucilium 86, 2; Tryph. D. 29, 1, 18, 1; Paul. D. 46, 1, 55; C. 3, 
36, 11; 6, 58, 15, 1. 
 
119
 Paul. D. 50, 17, 90; 44, 4, 1, 1; Ulp. D. 2, 14, 52, 3. Cf. Pringsheim: op. cit. 644. 
SUMMUM IUS SUMMA INIURIA… 315 
  
and ius iustitiaque, ranking these above ius (strictum).120 This idea was later 
taken over by Iustinian legal science, so the sources reflect the clear dominance 
of aequitas, to which the concepts of humanitas, iustitia, benignitas, utilitas and 
bona fides121 are associated,122 leaving to ius the meaning of strict, limited 
and—sit venia verbo—narrow-minded law, clinging to a rigid, word for word 
interpretation.123 The expression ius strictum cannot be found in the literary 
sources of the classical period, iudicium strictum is used as a technical term 
of rhetorical works.124 In Statius’s Silvae strictae leges are opposed with 
aequum;125 ius strictum only becomes an unquestionable technical term in 
Iustinian’s legal work.126 
 Returning to Cicero, the expressions „summo iure agere” and „summo iure 
contendere” indicate the use of the whole range of posibilities offered by the 
law,127 which in itself does not mean legal practice contradictory with aequitas, 
its being proper or improper becomes clear only in the concrete situation. At 
times Cicero has the possibility to be lenient, but the hostile behaviour of the 
opponent can make him legitimately act against this with the strictest means of 
the law, keeping in mind not only his personal interests but the interests of the 
state as well.128 (In connection with the summum ius being dependent on the 
specific situation, both Stroux129 and Bürge130 quote as a literary example, the 
scene from Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice in which, Portia as judge uses 
the literal, instead of the sensible interpretation of the law against Shylock, 
reluctant to accept the doge’s more equitable proposal, finally making him 
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formulated expressis verbis in connection with causa Curiana, treated by 
Cicero, the contradiction between interpretatio restrictiva and interpretatio 
extensiva being discussed here, regarding its content, it seems to belong to its 
essence. The basic question concerning the facts of the case is whether the 
substitutio pupillaris132 can also be regarded as substitutio vulgaris,133 and 
connected to this, the question whether the so-designed heir is also the heir of 
the bequeather, should also be answered.134 Q. Mucius Scaevola argued for 
the restrictive, L. Licinius Crassus argued for the extending interpretation. 
Consequently, both of them referred to auctores substantiating their opinion. 
Moreover, Crassus, employing the weapon of humor, made fun of the obsolete 
formulation of the legal text, thus ridiculing its restrictive interpretation.135 
(The decision made in causa Curiana did not prove to be of long-lasting value 
from the point of view of legal science, as we know about several later 
sententiae contradictory with this.136) As we have seen neither Cicero, nor other 
Roman legal scientists, basically reluctant to abstract definitions,137 determined 
the uncontradictory concept of aequitas. Therefore the decisiveness of the 
attempt to solve the scriptum–voluntas contradiction, emphasised by Stroux in 
connection with the causa Curiana,138 loses its validity because the aequitas 
did not act as a basic principle of judgement, but rather as a rhetorical orna-
ment.139 Crassus, who in the causa Curiana acted as patrocinium aequitatis, in 
another case proved to be the advocate of ius strictum. M. Marius Gratidianus 
sold a plot to C. Sergius Orta, from whom he had bought the same plot a few 
years earlier. The plot was loaded with servitudes,140 about which Sergius Orta, 
as the former owner must have had knowledge, however, at the signing of the 
contract, Gratidianus did not mention the servitutes, though this would have 
been his duty.141 In the case of actio empti the seller is responsible for the dolus, 
the judge had to decide whether Gratidianus proceeded dolose or not; the 
advocati of the parts had a great opportunity to influence the iudex, using 
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Antonius based his reasoning on aequitas, opposed to him, Crassus clung to the 
more restrictive interpretation. The appearance of these poles in the same case 
strongly resonates with the training practice of rhetoricians, according to which 
the magister divided the case to be discussed among the students in a way that 
half of them had to defend their point of view based on the aequitas, the other 
half based on ius strictum, then they changed the roles.143 
 In as much as we do not consider aequitas to be an abstract idea in these 
cases, but as a freely applicable rhetoric device, Cicero’s rather liberal handling 
of the concept of aequitas harmonises with the other statements dealing with the 
essence of eloquence.144 Within the boundaries desingated by legal science—
which in a given case can mean the facts of the case, determined by the iuris 
consultus—the orator can freely move concentrating his attention on the task 
of the defence, all the more so, as he is not striving for proving the truth, but 
for convincing the audience of the veri simile.145 (To illustrate this, Cicero tells 
the following example. A simple man from the country wanted to ask P. Crassus 
iuris consultus for advice, but the jurist sent him away, as he thought that he 
could do nothing for him. However, Servius Galba, the rhetor, presented him 
so many examples, parallels, arguments interlarded with humor, based on 
aequitas, and not on ius, in support of the rusticus, that the jurist—still not 
sharing the rhetor’s point of view—had to admit that his arguments were so 
probable that they almost sounded like truth.146) The freedom of movement of 
the rhetor is considerably greater than that of the jurist, as Gellius puts it, he is 
not closely tied to the truth content of the facts.147 The rhetor had to be able to 
argue for or against the same case, as this technique constituted a substantial 
part of rhetoric studies.148 The difference between legal and rhetorical methods 
was long preserved in Rome, as Quintilian admits in his Institutio oratoria, in 
the chapter in which he emphasises the importance of the rhetor’s acquiring 
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when, at the beginning of the Principate, political eloquence faltered, whereas 
eloquence lost its connections with jurisprudence by dealing with fictitious 
examples and solving more and more artificial rhetorical situations.150 
 
IV. Investigating the use and explanation of the proverbium „summum ius 
summa iniuria” in Erasmus of Rotterdam seems substantiated not so much due 
to the historical and depth of the Erasmian interpretation—as this idea was 
made the object of much more through-going legal theoretical scrutiny by 
numerous humanists e. g. Claudius Cantiuncula, Bonifacius Amerbach or 
Symon Grynaeus (if only due to Erasmus’s slighter interest for historical 
study)—, but for the immense influence over the centuries feeding on the 
enormous authority of this excellent humanist.151 Without entering a more 
meticulous genetic and influence study of Erasmus’s Adagia, it can be stated 
that from its first edition in the XVI century until the end of the XVIII century, 
it was used as a widely appeciateed scholary text book, thus it can be safely 
assumed that the „summum ius summa iniuria” paroemia gained considerable 
popularity among humanists, theologians, philosophers, as it is proved by its 
being frequently quoted in the most various context.152 
 As Erasmus was taking effort to perfect the Adagia until the end of his life, 
several versions and explanations of this idea are to be encountered in the 
Erasmian corpus. The first edition dating from 1500 mentions the proverb in 
two places,153 first in connection with the Terentian quotation „summum ius 
summa malitia”,154 later referring to Plato and Cicero under the title of „ad 
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1536 synthetizes every known occurence of this idea in Latin authors.157 
Before enumerating and analysing the loci, trying to avoid the charge that he 
includes sententiae instead of adagia i. e. proverbs Erasmus gives a long 
explanation, finally finding his aquittal in quoting the Terentian nominatim.158 
 Erasmus himself—not being a jurist—dedicated less attention to the legal 
paroemia, except a few explanations referring to Iustitia. Only four years 
before his death, in 1532 Erasmus became interested in juridic regulations and 
asked his friend, Bonifacius Amerbach in a letter to send him some material, 
suitable for the completion of tha Adagia. Then, after having received the two-
page-long collection, he urged his friend to send him some more. It is highly 
probable that this was how the quotations provening from the Roman sources 
found their way into the 1540 edition of the Adagia.159 In Erasmus’s inter-
pretation the aequitas often mentioned to highlight the „summum ius summa 
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ius appellant, cum de verbis iuris contenditur, neque spectatur quid senserit is qui scripsit. 
Nam voces ac litterae, quasi legum summa cutis est, Eam ineptiam quorundam super-
stitiosorum iuris interpretum, copiose simul et eleganter illudit M. Tullius in actione pro 
Murena (§§ 25–27). Terentius (IV, 5, 47; v. 796), Verum illud Cherme dicunt, ius summum 
saepe summa malitia est. M. Tullius Officiorum libro primo (10, 33): Ex quo illud, summum 
ius, summa iniuria, factum est iam tritum sermone proverbium. Columella primo rei rusticae 
libro (7, 2): Nec sane est vindicandum nobis, quicquid licet. Nam summum ius antiqui 
summam putabant crucem. Citatur et Celsus adolescens libro Pandect. Quadragesimo 
quinto, titulo De verborum obligatione, Cap. Si servum Stichum (D. 45. 1. 91. 3, i. f.): qui 
scripserit quaestionem esse de bono et equo, in quo genere plerunque sub auctoritate iuris 
scientiae periculose erratur. Itidem Paulus libro quinquagesimo, titulo, De regulis iuris (D. 
50. 17. 90): In omnibus quidem, maxime tamen in iure aequitas spectanda est. Simili figura 
Seneca libro De ira primo dixit, summo animo. Si intelligis non ex alto venire nequitiam, sed 
summo, quod aiunt, animo inhaerere. 
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 Kisch: op. cit. 207. 
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iniuria” paroemia probably did not so much mean equity as legal interpretive 
principle, but rather justice, that should be enforced even against the letter of 
the law.160 For the explanations Erasmus usually makes appeal to antique 
authors generally with the exact documentation of the sources but at times 
without summarizing their content; the concept of aequitas is most often 
simply used in the sense of aequum et bonum, as the opposite of iniquitas, 
placing the spirit of the law above its letter. One can find the type of the 
Ciceronian pair of concepts in the Aristotelian Ethica Nicomachea, according 
to which a man can be regarded equitable, if he is satisfied with less, even if 
the law is on his side, and does not stick to his own justice in the detriment of 
others, so equity is none other than a kind of justice.161 It is interesting though, 
that Erasmus does not make reference to Aristotle in the early editions of the 
Adagia. It is only the edition of 1536 and 1540, which permit us to assume that 
probably he had in mind the specific locus from Ethica Nicomachea. In these 
latter editions reference is made to Cicero’s Pro Murena, instead of Pro 
Caecina, naturally, together with the classic formulation of the proverbium, 
which can be read in De officiis. We can suspect Aristotelian influence—rather 
on an ideological level not so much in the concrete wording—in the reference 
to the intention of the legislator opposed to the letter of the law.162 The „voces … 
quasi legum cutis est” picture, i. e. the words constitute the skin, the outward 
layer, is presumably Erasmus’s own; Erasmus’s attention to the two legal 
fragments by—Celsus and Paulus respectively—from the Digesta by Iustinian 
was probably called by Bonifacius Amerbach, but he used these rather as a 
kind of illustration without examining either their historical or dogmatic 
background.163 
 
Reaching the end of our introspection, we can draw the following conclusions. 
From the maxims of legal logic as means of legal interpretation, in the present 
work we made the proverbium „summum ius summa iniuria” the object of our 
scrutiny, enumerating its occurences in the antique literary sources, namely in 
Terence, Columella then in Cicero. In this last formulation the meaning of the 
proverb became the most clearly crystallized, it signifies the excessive, 
malevolent legal practice in the course of interpretatio iuris, playing the letter 
of the law against its spirit. Following this we tried to trace the different 
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pretatio itself, in the course of which interpretatio, combining mutatis 
mutandis the nuances of the religious sphere on the one hand, and those of the 
grammatical field on the other hand, until it reached the semantic content of 
interpretive activity, becoming a determinal factor by the classical age. The 
Celsian „ius est ars boni et aequi” sententia formulates one of the most general, 
all-encompassing basic principles of interpretatio meant to offer protection 
against the too strictly interpreted and applied summum ius. Although jurists 
never clearly defined the concept of aequitas, it became a very important 
means of legal development as a thought emerging from the interaction of 
iurisprudence and eloquence. By presenting the relevant loci from Erasmus of 
Rotterdam’s Adagia as a typical example of the persistence of the paroemia 
„summum ius summa iniuria”, we wanted to show the way a proverb becoming 
regula iuris—apart from its direct legal application—became an integral part 
of today’s legal common knowledge. 
 
 
